A full discussion and analysis of non-immigration visas can be found in crS RL31381, U.S. Immigration Policy on Temporary Admissions, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. It is also possible that the EU will include the issue of migration in future trade agreements, with a conditionality that links migration restrictions to trade incentives. The migration of rehabilitation controls indicates that “trade policy should take into account the policy framework for the return and readmission of irregular migrants”78, without elaborating. Dr Evita Schmieg is associated with SWP`s EU/Europe division. The study was carried out as part of a project funded by the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development on Trade and Development in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals. The following checklist on the relationship between trade and migration aims to consolidate and assess the main possible effects (including different trade instruments). However, it can only reconcile the complex links between trade instruments and migration flows and does not claim to be exhaustive. Nevertheless, known factors and indicators are identified and must be taken into account in the analysis of thought. A widely debated model, called the “migration bump,” implied these perspectives.
Professor Philip Martin, chair of the comparative immigration and integration program at the University of California Davis, proposed this migration model, which is illustrated in Chart 3, during the NAFTA debate in the early 1990s. Martin theorized that in the years immediately following the implementation of NAFTA, migration would first increase and decrease thereafter. Martin predicted that migration figures would be at the point where they would have been without NAFTA after 15 years and that migration would be much lower over a 30-year period.36 In 2002, Philip Martin concluded that “NAFTA will reduce unwanted migration between Mexico and the United States in the medium and long term, as trade becomes a substitute for immigration.” 37 Even unilateral preferences for least developed countries (LDCs) on the basis of the LDC exemption (53) introduced by the WTO in 2011 have not significantly boosted mode 4 imports from these countries. An exception is necessary because WTO rules require all countries to be treated on the same treatment. The privileges allowed by the waiver are not negotiated between trading countries, but are granted unilaterally, in which case 25 industrialized countries include the EU, which grant temporary preferences to LDCs until 2030. However, they largely apply to Fashion 2, where consumers use services abroad. This is an area in which there are already few restrictions, so preferential regimes do little more than codify a pre-existing level of liberalization.54 According to the UN Development Committee, these rules have almost no impact on the exports of services from this group of countries – especially less so with regard to the provision of services by individuals. In addition, because they are granted unilaterally, preferences can be withdrawn. This uncertainty means that they are less valuable than the results of trade negotiations, which are unrestricted.