[3] See Lackey (2010) and Christensen (2009) for more extreme disagreements. Intuitively, Eve should give up believing that the shares are $43 if she learns that Ava disagrees. Given the differences of opinion, she should not believe in any part of the bill either and no one else should sit at the table. How do you react if you recognize this fact? Should you lose confidence in our own beliefs, gain trust, reject your own beliefs, accept the convictions of others, suspend judgment on this question or give another answer? This is the epistemical problem of differences of opinion. We contrast differences of opinion on the belief of disagreements on issues of taste. We focus on differences of opinion when there is a fact, or at least the participants are reasonable to believe that there is such a fact. A major objection to equality of weight and other points of view that require doxastic conciliation is that such views defeat themselves. To express this objection, see Elga 2010, Frances 2010, O`Connor 1999, Plantinga 2000a and 2000b, Taliaferro 2009, Weatherson 2014 and Weintraub 2013. For more answers, please visit Bogardus 2009, Christensen 2009, Elga 2010, Graves 2013, Kornblith 2013, Littlejohn 2013, Matheson 2015b and Pittard 2015. In short, there are differences of opinion on the epistemic importance of differences of opinion, so that any point of view that requires mediation in the discovery of disagreements may lead it to claim its own rejection.

For example, an equality advocate might draw attention to a sufficient number of people well placed in the theory of knowledge of disagreement, but who deny that the point of view of equality is correct. Under Equal Weight View rules, this defender would give up sight and could even accept a competing account. For these reasons, Plantinga (2000a) argued that such views were “incoherent” (522) and Elga (2010) asserted that such views were “inconsistent” and “subdividing” (179). Such a concern seems to apply to the “equal weight” view, the view of the justification and the overview of the evidence. To the extent that these three points of view require, in at least some cases, conciliation, they are all (at least in principle) subject to such an outcome. A final answer argues that these principles of disagreement are themselves exempt from their conciliatory rules. These principles therefore require, well understood, mediation in ordinary dissent, but require to remain firm in the event of disagreement over differences of opinion. From this point of view, the real principles are not self-destructive. Several philosophers have argued for such a response to the problems of self-destruction. Bogardus (2009) argues that we can only “see” that conciliatory principles are true, which prevents them from undermining themselves.

Elga (2010) argues that conciliatory, well-understood views are free, because basic principles must be dogmatic about their own accuracy. Pittard (2015) argues that it is no longer suspensive to remain determined in the field of mediation than to be conciliatory. The reasoning here is that conciliators on conciliatory principles would be suspensive on belief or credibility, but firm on its own reasoning. Therefore, as soon as we appreciate the different levels of faith/credibility and reasoning, a response to a disagreement about the importance of differences will require a firm response at one level. According to Mr Pittard, the firmness of conciliation is not a problem. Opponents have rejected the epistemic meaning of the perspective of the self (see Bogardus 2013b and Rattan 2014). While the perspective of the first person is inexorable, it is not infallible. Moreover, from the point of view of the self, there are reasons for a doxastic reconciliation. This is my proof that my interlocutor is my peer and my proof of what she believes requires doxastic change.