For example, an equality advocate might draw attention to a sufficient number of people well placed in the theory of knowledge of disagreement, but who deny that the point of view of equality is correct. Under Equal Weight View rules, this defender would give up sight and could even accept a competing account. For these reasons, Plantinga (2000a) argued that such views were “incoherent” (522) and Elga (2010) asserted that such views were “inconsistent” and “subdividing” (179). Such a concern seems to apply to the “equal weight” view, the view of the justification and the overview of the evidence. To the extent that these three points of view require, in at least some cases, conciliation, they are all (at least in principle) subject to such an outcome. A final answer argues that these principles of disagreement are themselves exempt from their conciliatory rules. These principles therefore require, well understood, mediation in ordinary dissent, but require to remain firm in the event of disagreement over differences of opinion. From this point of view, the real principles are not self-destructive. Several philosophers have argued for such a response to the problems of self-destruction. Bogardus (2009) argues that we can only “see” that conciliatory principles are true, which prevents them from undermining themselves.
Elga (2010) argues that conciliatory, well-understood views are free, because basic principles must be dogmatic about their own accuracy. Pittard (2015) argues that it is no longer suspensive to remain determined in the field of mediation than to be conciliatory. The reasoning here is that conciliators on conciliatory principles would be suspensive on belief or credibility, but firm on its own reasoning. Therefore, as soon as we appreciate the different levels of faith/credibility and reasoning, a response to a disagreement about the importance of differences will require a firm response at one level. According to Mr Pittard, the firmness of conciliation is not a problem. Opponents have rejected the epistemic meaning of the perspective of the self (see Bogardus 2013b and Rattan 2014). While the perspective of the first person is inexorable, it is not infallible. Moreover, from the point of view of the self, there are reasons for a doxastic reconciliation. This is my proof that my interlocutor is my peer and my proof of what she believes requires doxastic change.